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The EU’s human rights obligations in relation to policies with extraterritorial 
effects 
 
Lorand Bartels* 
 
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man 
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If 
a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the 
less … 
John Donne, Meditation XVII (1624) 
Introduction 
That states can be responsible for the effects of their economic policies in third 
countries is not controversial. Thanks to a network of international trade agreements, 
virtually all states are under obligations designed to protect the economic interests of 
the producers of imported goods and services. And yet the proposition that states 
should also be responsible for the human rights effects of such policy measures is not 
universally accepted. Thus, a subsidy that causes injury to the domestic industry of a 
WTO Member or a market access barrier that negatively affects conditions of 
competition for imported products can violate trade obligations. But even if those 
effects on the producers of those products are severe,1 it is debatable whether they are 
capable of violating any given human rights obligations. In short, the extent to which 
human rights obligations apply to policies with extraterritorial effects is still very 
much an open question. 
 
This article considers the extent to which EU law applies to such policies, which is to 
say EU policies with extraterritorial effects on persons outside of EU territory. Section 
A discusses the human rights aspects of Article 3(5) and Article 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which date from the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Second B looks at 
the jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice on EU fundamental rights as these exist 
as general principles of EU law and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as 
influenced by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Section C 
discusses the EU’s obligation to comply with its international obligations, including 
with the human rights clauses found in all EU trade and cooperation agreements and 
with customary international law. Section D considers the enforceability of these 
obligations by the EU institutions and individuals. Section E summarises and 
concludes. 
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1 See, for example, ‘The Ghana Chicken Case’ and ‘The Kenyan Farmers Case’ in Fons Coomans and 
Rolf Künnemann (eds), Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). The Kenyan government has been ordered 
to consult civil society on free trade agreement negotiations with the EU: Kenya Small Scale Farmers 
Forum & 6 others v Republic of Kenya & 2 others [2013] eKLR (High Court of Kenya, 31 Oct 2013). 
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A few words on the scope of this article are in order. In the first place, it does not 
consider the whether human rights obligations are capable of applying to 
extraterritorial conduct. Just because an obligation applies to extraterritorial conduct 
with extraterritorial effects does not mean that it also applies to domestic conduct with 
extraterritorial effects.2 Second, this article does not look at two special situations in 
which domestic measures have extraterritorial effects, but which have not been 
considered extraterritorial (or controversial). The first of these is the obligation not to 
expose a person to risks of human rights violations taking place extraterritorially.3 The 
other concerns obligations in relation to the domestic property (or similar economic 
interests) of persons located extraterritorially.4 While the governing assumption that 
these situations raise no extraterritorial issues may be challenged, it is not necessary 
to do so for the more limited purposes of this article. 
A Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) two 
provisions relevant to EU policies with extraterritorial effects. The first of these, 
Article 3(5) TEU, states: 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its 
values [as defined in Article 2 TEU] and interests and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free 
and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 
 
This paragraph has three parts. It establishes EU objectives to ‘promote’ the EU’s 
values and interests abroad, and to ‘contribute to’ the other norms mentioned. It 
establishes an obligation to achieve these objectives.5 And, according to the EU Court 
of Justice, it establishes an obligation to act consistently with the norms mentioned, 
including international law and, by extension, international human rights obligations.6 
 
                                                          
2  These two extraterritorial dimensions of human rights obligations are often conflated. See, eg, 
Principle 8(a) of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, contained in Olivier de Schutter et al, ‘Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 HRQ 1084 at 1101, which states that ‘[f]or the purposes of these Principles, 
extraterritorial obligations encompass: … obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, 
within or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s 
territory’. 
3 Eg Soering (ECtHR, Appl No 14038/88, 7 Jul 1989); discussed in Banković (ECtHR, Appl No 
52207/99, 12 Dec 2001), para 70. For a ruling to this effect under the EU Charter, see Joined Cases 
C‑ 411/10 and C‑ 493/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-nyr (21 Dec 
2011). 
4 Eg Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi I [2008] ECR I-6351, para 371. 
5 According to Declaration No 41 TEU, this may be done, if necessary, by resort to Article 352 TFEU. 
6 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America [2011] ECR I-nyr (21 Dec 2011), para 101. See 
further below at p [text to n 31]. 
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The second relevant provision is Article 21 TEU, located in Chapter 1 of Title V, 
which covers all aspects of the EU’s external action, including but not limited to its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).7 Article 21(1) TEU states that: 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
 
This provision is virtually identical to the obligation contained in Article 3(5) TEU. 
The difference is that Article 3(5) requires the EU to ‘uphold’ its values ‘in its 
relations with the wider world’ and to ‘contribute’ to a set of objectives, while Article 
21(1) requires the EU to ‘be guided by’ a similar set of principles in its ‘action on the 
international scene’. Both of these provisions can be seen as establishing objectives 
the pursuit of which is an EU obligation. 
 
Next is Article 21(3)(1) TEU, which has arguably not gained the attention it deserves. 
This subparagraph states that: 
 
The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different 
areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external 
aspects of its other policies. 
 
Importantly, this subparagraph does not simply refer to the paragraphs above, but 
rather to the principles in paragraph 1 and the objectives in paragraph 2. Beyond this, 
Article 21(3)(1) is significant in two ways.  
 
First, it extends the scope of application of the EU’s external human rights 
obligations. Article 3(5) refers to the ‘EU’s relations with the wider world’, and 
Articles 21(1) to the EU’s ‘action on the international scene’. By contrast, Article 
21(3)(1) refers not only to ‘the development and implementation of the different areas 
of the Union’s external action’ but also – notably – to ‘the development and 
implementation … of the external aspects of [the EU’s] other policies’. It is therefore 
clear that the principles set out in Article 21(3)(1) apply not just to EU policies, nor 
even only to EU external policies, but it applies also to the external aspects of the 
EU’s internal policies. This is so, it might be added, even though Article 21 is located 
in a part of the EU Treaty devoted to external action. Second, Article 21(3)(1) is 
normatively stronger than Article 3(5) and Article 23(1). These require the EU to 
‘uphold’, ‘contribute to’, and be ‘guided by’ the principles and objectives described 
therein. As the EU Court of Justice has affirmed, these phrases are not devoid of 
                                                          
7 Article 21 TEU also features in some of the EU’s more specific external policies. Article 205 TFEU 
requires the EU’s external action to ‘be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be 
conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union [ie Article 21 TEU]’ and similar language is used in Articles 207 TFEU on the 
common commercial policy and Article 208 TFEU on development cooperation. 
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normative force. 8  But insofar as it requires the EU to ‘respect’ the principles 
previously described, Article 21(3)(1) puts this beyond doubt. 
 
It must be acknowledged that the principles listed in Article 21(1) do not, strictly 
speaking, include the principle of respect for human rights itself. Relevantly, it refers 
rather to the principle of respect for the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. But it makes no sense to oblige the EU to respect this 
principle without also obliging it to respect the human rights on which it is based.9 By 
necessary implication, then, it follows that the EU is obliged to respect human rights 
in its external and internal policies.  
 
To say that the EU is required under EU law to ensure that its policies to not have 
negative effects on human rights in third countries is itself a significant result. But do 
these provisions go further, and encompass the two other panels of the human rights 
triptych: the obligation to ‘protect’ the human rights of persons from the activities of 
other actors, and the obligation to ‘fulfil’ the human rights of those persons? In fact, 
the answer to these questions is much more muted. As mentioned, Article 3(5) TEU 
requires the EU to ‘promote’ human rights in its relations with the wider world and 
‘contribute to’ the ‘protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child’. 
Article 21(2) TEU also states that the EU must act, unilaterally and in cooperation, in 
order to pursue the objectives of, inter alia, ‘consolidat[ing] and support[ing] 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’,10 
and this requirement is reinforced by Article 21(3)(1) TEU. Certainly, this means that 
the EU must act in some way to pursue these objectives and achieve these ends. But 
these provisions do not require the EU to do this in any particular way. Thus, to give 
some examples, it cannot be said that the EU is required to act positively to protect 
persons located extraterritorially from the acts of EU businesses operating in other 
countries, or to even to provide development aid to developing countries in order to 
fulfil their human rights. 
B General Principles and the EU Charter (Articles 6(1) and 6(3) TEU) 
Beyond these newer provisions in the EU Treaty, there are other sources of human (or 
‘fundamental’) rights obligations in the form of general principles of EU law and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.11 Both of these sources of obligations now have 
                                                          
8 See above at n 6. 
9  This is indeed an even stronger implication than the implication on which the Court based its 
understanding of Article 3(5) TEU, discussed below at [text to n 31]. 
10 The overlap between the objectives in Article 21(2) TEU and Article 3(5) TEU can cause difficulties. 
For example, a measure with the objective of international peace and security falls within the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and therefore does not support a reference to Article 352 
TEU. On the other hand, the pursuit of international peace and security is also one of the principles of 
the UN Charter referred to in Article 3(5) TEU, which does support a reference to Article 352 TFEU. 
This overlap should doubtless be resolved in favour of the CFSP. On the other hand, it is going too far 
to say that all of the objectives in Article 21(2)(a)-(c) TEU are CFSP objectives, as did AG Bot in Case 
C-130/10, Parliament v Council (Al Qaeda) (AG Opinion) [2012] ECR I-nyr, para 64. The Court did 
not express itself on the point: cf Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council (Al Qaeda) [2012] ECR I-nyr, 
para 62. 
11 See the different views of Valentina Bazzocchi, ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Giacomo di Federico (ed), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument (Springer: Vienna, 2011) at 196 and 
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the rank of primary law, being enshrined in Article 6(1) and Article 6(3) EU 
respectively.12 Neither contains any rule on their extraterritorial application, nor has 
the jurisprudence properly dealt with this issue (except for the case of EU-based 
property owned by foreigners abroad).13 This means that it is not certain whether 
fundamental rights apply to policy measures with extraterritorial effect on non-EU 
nationals, especially when these effects are not associated with any other EU rights 
and obligations. 
 
There have been some cases tangentially relevant to the issue. In the first place, the 
EU Court of Justice made a general statement in Parliament v Council (Al Qaeda) 
that ‘the duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with Article 
51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on all the 
institutions and bodies of the Union.’14 Strictly speaking, this does not shed much 
light on the issue. However, the Court said this in response to an objection by the 
European Parliament that a measure adopted under the EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) would escape fundamental rights guarantees. It may therefore 
be that the Court had general CFSP measures in mind, and the statement can be taken 
as an acknowledgement that such measures are subject to EU fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, given the nature of CFSP measures, this could also be taken as an 
indication that fundamental rights have some extraterritorial application. Even so, 
however, it would not be certain whether this would be in respect of extraterritorial 
conduct or measures with extraterritorial effect, or both. 
 
Another case is Mugraby, in which the applicant claimed damages from the EU in 
respect of injuries allegedly committed by Lebanon in breach of his human rights.15 
Mugraby argued that these injuries were the result of the EU Council and 
Commission not adopting ‘appropriate measures’ under the human rights clause in the 
EU-Lebanon association agreement.16 The action failed on the merits,17 but the Court 
did not question the assumption that the EU might be responsible for a violation of the 
applicant’s human rights by a third party in a third country. Similarly, in Zaoui the 
applicants sought compensation for the loss of a family member killed by a Hamas 
bomb in Israel. 18  The argument was that the EU was responsible because of its 
funding of education in the Palestinian territories, which in turn incited hatred and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Valeria Bonavita, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Social Dimension of International 
Trade’, in di Federico, ibid, at 260. See also Tamara Hervey, ‘The “Right to Health” in European Union 
Law’ in Tamara Hervey and Jeff Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – A Legal Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2003) at 212. 
12 For a discussion of the relationship between the EU Charter (under Article 6(1) TEU) and general 
principles of law (under Article 6(3) TEU) see Herwig Hofmann and Bucura Mihaescu, ‘The Relation 
between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good 
Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 73. 
13 Eg above at n 4. 
14 Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council (Al Qaeda) [2012] ECR I-nyr (19 July 2012), para 83.  
15 Another claim was for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU. 
16 Case T-292/09, Mugraby [2011] ECR II-255 (General Court, Order, 6 Sep 2011); Case C‑ 581/11 P, 
Mugraby [2012] ECR I-nyr (Grand Chamber, Order, 12 Jul 2012). 
17 The relevant EU institutions had not manifestly and gravely disregarded their discretion to adopt 
‘appropriate measures’, which is a condition of an action for non-contractual damages: Case C-352/98 
P Bergaderm [2000] ECR I-5291, paras 42-46. 
18 Case C-288/03 P Zaoui [2005] ECR I-nyr, paras 13-15. 
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terrorism and led to the attack. The applications failed to demonstrate that the EU’s 
policies caused the damage, but again it was not questioned that the EU could be 
liable for non-contractual damage in another country. It is admittedly speculative to 
reason on the basis of unargued points that fundamental rights extend to policy 
measures with extraterritorial effects, but these cases indicate that at least there is no 
obvious bar to such actions. 
 
In this respect, the positions adopted by some of the EU political institutions are 
relevant. In 2011, the Commission and the CFSP High Representative stated that: 
 
EU external action has to comply with the rights contained in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights which became binding EU law under the Lisbon 
Treaty, as well as with the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights.19  
  
Likewise, the European Parliament has said, in a Resolution on the establishment of 
the European External Action Service, that ‘the EEAS must guarantee full application 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in all aspects of the Union’s external action in 
accordance with the spirit and purpose of the Lisbon Treaty’.20 These statements may 
be limited in their scope to extraterritorial conduct rather than policy measures with 
extraterritorial effects. However, a 2011 EU regulation goes further, considering that 
the EU’s human rights obligations apply to measures with only extraterritorial effects: 
 
The Member States should comply with the Union’s general provisions on 
external action, such as consolidating democracy, respect for human rights and 
policy coherence for development, and the fight against climate change, when 
establishing, developing and implementing their national export credit systems 
and when carrying out their supervision of officially supported export credit 
activities.21 
 
All of these statements are of political rather than legal value. Nonetheless, they may 
indicate that these institutions would not object to the extension of the Charter to such 
policy measures. 
 
In this context, and especially given the lack of certainty on the point at issue, it is 
relevant to consider the position on this point of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). While this Convention is no longer cited as often since the adoption 
of the EU Charter, 22  in formal terms it is still relevant to the determination of 
                                                          
19 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy Communication on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action 
– Towards a More Effective Approach, COM (2011) 886 final, 12 December 2011, at 7. 
20 European Parliament resolution on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External 
Action Service [2010] OJ C/265E, para 5. 
21 Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 
on the application of certain guidelines in the field of officially supported export credits [2011] OJ 
L326/45, recital 4. 
22 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a Human 
Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 168, especially 
at 175. For the view that the Charter is now seen as hierarchically supreme, see Nikos Lavranos, ‘The 
ECJ’s Judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson: Une ménage à trois difficulté’ (2013) 4 European 
Law Reporter 133. 
 7 
fundamental rights in EU law. This is in two respects. First, it serves as a formal 
inspiration for the general principles of fundamental rights applicable under Article 
6(3) TEU.23 Second, it governs the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (applicable 
under Article 6(1) TEU), at least insofar as the ‘meaning and scope’ of the two sets of 
rights is concerned.24 
 
Looking to the ECHR, however, does little to clarify the issue. While there have in 
recent years been a number of cases on the application of the Convention to 
extraterritorial conduct,25 there has been virtually none in relation to its application to 
policy measures with mere extraterritorial effects (other than cases involving 
property), and those that have been decided are in conflict.26 One of the few cases on 
point is Kovačič, which concerned Slovenian legislative acts that prevented Croatian 
nationals from withdrawing funds from the Croatian branch of a Slovenian bank. The 
Court said that ‘the acts of the Slovenian authorities continue to produce effects, albeit 
outside Slovenian territory, such that Slovenia’s responsibility under the Convention 
could be engaged’. 27  In contrast, in Ben El Mahi, certain persons in Morocco 
challenged a decision by Denmark to permit the local publication of a cartoon, and the 
Court held that persons located extraterritorially who are merely affected by the 
conduct of a contracting party are not within the ‘jurisdiction’ of a contracting party.28 
How to reconcile these two cases is unclear.29 
 
In any case, it may be doubted whether the EU Court of Justice would adopt the 
various solutions under the ECHR position or the ICESCR on the extraterritorial 
application of EU fundamental rights protections. It is more likely that the EU Court 
                                                          
23 See Case C-479/04, Laserdisken [2006] ECR I-8089, para 61. 
24  Article 52(3) of the EU Charter states that ‘[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
This applies also to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights: C-400/10 McB [2010] ECR 
I-8992, para 53. 
25 Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 11-
18; Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why 
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 857; Karen Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights 
Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), Ch 2. 
26  See Maarten den Heijer and Rick Lawson, ‘Extraterritorial Human Rights and the Concept of 
“Jurisdiction”’ in Malcolm Langford et al (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial 
Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2013) at 185-6; 
Daniel Augenstein and David Kinley, ‘When Human Rights “Responsibilities” become “Duties”: The 
Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations’ in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), 
Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2014). An exception is the application of the ECHR to the property of non-residents, which is 
seemingly not controversial. 
27 Kovačič (ECtHR, Appl No 44574/98, admissibility, 9 Oct 2003). See den Heijer and Lawson, ibid, at 
179. Note also Tatar (ECtHR, Appl No 67021/01, 27 Jan 2009, in French only), para 111, in which the 
Court said in an obiter dictum that states must prevent the transfer of environmentally damaging 
substances to neighbouring countries. See Augenstein and Kinley, ibid. 
28 Ben El Mahi (ECtHR, App No 5853/06) (11 Dec 2006). 
29 The notion of espace juridique, to the extent that this means anything, is not relevant. For discussion 
of its use and misuse, see Ralph Wilde, ‘The “Legal Space” or “espace juridique” of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?’ (2005) 10 European 
Human Rights Law Review 115. 
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of Justice would seek to carve out its own position, based on the particular context in 
which EU fundamental rights apply. 
C International obligations as EU obligations 
In addition to the self-standing human rights obligations found in EU law, the EU is 
also required to respect international human rights obligations to the extent that these 
are binding on the EU under treaties or customary international law. This monist 
approach to international law is of long standing,30 but it was placed on a new footing 
in Air Transport Association of America, when the EU Court of Justice said this: 
 
Under Article 3(5) TEU, the European Union is to contribute to the strict 
observance and the development of international law. Consequently, when it 
adopts an act, it is bound to observe international law in its entirety, including 
customary international law, which is binding upon the institutions of the 
European Union.31 
 
The EU has only concluded one multilateral international human rights treaty, namely 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.32 Other than this, it is not 
formally bound by any multilateral or regional human rights treaty, including, prior to 
EU accession, the European Convention on Human Rights. It might be thought that 
some human rights treaties are binding on the EU under the doctrine of ‘functional 
succession’, but human rights are not an area of exclusive EU competence,33 nor does 
the EU claim (and other parties do not therefore recognize) such a status.34 Even as a 
matter of EU law, the EU is therefore not bound by any multilateral human rights 
instruments. Nonetheless, the EU is bound by the human rights norms included in the 
large number of trade and cooperation agreements that it has concluded with other 
states since the early 1990s. 
                                                          
30 Case 181/73, Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para 5; Case C-286/90, Poulsen [1992] ECR I-6019, para 
9. Treaties are binding as EU law under Article 216(2) TFEU. 
31 Case C-366/10, ATAA, above at n 6, para 101 and 123. Whether this was a good interpretation is 
debatable. A requirement to ‘contribute to the strict observance … of international law’ is not the same 
as (nor does it necessarily imply) a requirement to ‘observe’ international law. Further, as Article 3(5) 
TEU is not addressed to the Member States, presumably the Court’s original jurisprudence will in any 
case continue to explain why they are also bound by customary international law when acting within 
the scope of EU law. 
32 Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010] OJ L23/35. 
33 The doctrine of ‘functional succession’ was applied to the GATT in Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, 
International Fruit [1972] ECR 1219 and more recently (by the Court of First Instance) to the UN 
Charter in Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi I [2005] ECR II–3649, para 200. Following Case C-
308/06, Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para 49, and Case C-366/10, ATAA, above at n 31, it is now 
clear that this requires the EU to have acquired exclusive legislative competence in an area. This means 
that, contrary to the Court of First Instance in Kadi I, the EU has not ‘functionally succeeded’ to the 
UN Charter. For a discussion, see Robert Schütze, ‘The ‘Succession Doctrine’ and the European Union’ 
in Anthony Arnull et al (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? (Oxford: Hart, 2011); Jan Wouters et 
al, ‘Worlds Apart? Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature 
to International Law’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No 96, August 
2012. 
34 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit, observations of the Commission, ibid at 1225; Case C-
366/10, ATAA, above at n 6 (AG Opinion), para 64, and Wouters et al, ibid, at 13. 
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1 EU human rights clauses 
There are human rights clauses in treaties between the EU and over 120 other states. 
Their wording varies somewhat, but in their standard form they have two parts. The 
first is an ‘essential elements’ clause stating that: 
 
Respect for democratic principles and human rights, as laid down in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human 
rights instruments, as well as for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the 
internal and international policies of both Parties and constitutes an essential 
element of this Agreement.
35
 
 
The second is a ‘non-execution’ clause providing that either party may adopt 
‘appropriate measures’ if the other fails to comply with its obligations under the 
agreement, which is taken (and sometimes stated) to include the essential elements of 
the agreement. There are also typically other provisions elaborating on such 
‘appropriate measures’. 
 
The legal effect of essential elements clauses is not entirely certain,
36
 but the 
conventional view is that they contain obligations binding on the parties. The scope of 
these clauses is broad, applying both to the internal and international policies of the 
parties. Moreover, the reference to international policies implies that these clauses 
govern extraterritorial effects of at least ‘international’ policies. Given the difficulty 
of distinguishing between internal policies and international policies, there seems 
little merit in seeking to draw a distinction between the two. One can therefore 
conclude that, textually, these clauses apply to policies with extraterritorial effects.  
 
This interpretation is also supported by practice. In 2002, the EU adopted ‘appropriate 
measures’ under the Cotonou Agreement in relation to Liberia for a variety of reasons, 
one of which was its assistance to the Front uni révolutionnaire (RUF) of Sierra 
Leone, which was accused of committing gross human rights violations in that 
country.
37
 This followed a UN Security Council Resolution, and follow up activity, 
concerning Liberia’s material and financial support to the RUF in Sierra Leone.38 The 
EU thus seems to have accepted that the essential elements clause covers policies with 
effects in other countries, independent of any extraterritorial conduct. For present 
purposes, this is an important result. The EU’s human rights clauses are bilateral, and 
therefore under these clauses the EU’s policies must also respect human rights in 
other states. 
                                                          
35 This example is taken from Article 2 of the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. For 
discussion of the variations and their legal significance see Lorand Bartels, Human Rights 
Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford: OUP, 2005), Ch 4. 
36 Bartels, ibid, 93-99. 
37 Letter annexed to Council Decision of 25 March 2002 concluding consultations with Liberia under 
Articles 96 and 97 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement [2002] OJ L96/23. 
38 See First Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001) 
regarding Liberia, UN Doc S/2001/424, 30 Apr 2001. 
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2 Customary international law 
As noted above, by virtue of Article 3(5) TEU the EU’s obligations under customary 
international law are also binding and potentially enforceable as EU obligations. 
There are several customary international law obligations relevant to state conduct 
with extraterritorial effects on human rights in third states. 
 Ancillary responsibility for involvement in violations by third states (a)
In the first place, customary international law recognizes that states and, by extension, 
international organizations may be responsible for conduct ancillary to violations of 
international law by other actors. Rules to this effect may be found in primary 
obligations, for example the obligation to prevent genocide,39 which can be triggered 
by a risk of genocide occurring anywhere in the world.40 More generically, there are 
secondary obligations to this effect, which have been codified in the two sets of 
Articles on the international responsibility of states and international organizations.41  
 
These rules prohibit states and international organizations from knowingly aiding and 
abetting another actor42 in the commission of a wrongful act,43 knowingly directing or 
controlling the commission of the wrongful act by another actor44 and knowingly 
coercing another actor to commit a wrongful act.45 There are also ancillary obligations 
triggered by serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law, such as 
apartheid, torture, slavery and genocide. These obligations are to cooperate to bring to 
an end through lawful means any serious breach [of peremptory norms] and ‘[not to] 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [of peremptory norms], nor 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation’.46 
 
These rules are potentially relevant to policy measures with extraterritorial effects. 
The UN Special Rapporteur for Food, Olivier de Schutter, has given a striking 
example. Citing Article 18 of the Articles on State Responsibility, he has advanced the 
proposition that:  
 
                                                          
39 In Bosnian Genocide (Bosnia/Serbia) [2007] ICJ Rep 595, paras 166-169, the ICJ determined that 
this was an obligation of states parties to the Genocide Convention. It expressly left open the question 
whether this was also an obligation under customary international law (at para 429). 
40 Bosnian Genocide, ibid, paras 429-431. See Marko Milanović, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide: A 
Follow-Up’ (2007) 18 EJIL 669, at 684-8. 
41 Articles on the Responsibility of States (ARS), annexed to UNGA Res 56/83, UN Doc A/RES/56/83, 
12 Dec 2001; Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), annexed to UNGA 
Res 66/100, UN Doc A/Res/66/100, 27 Feb 2012. 
42 One would expect a four-way split with both states and international organizations bearing ancillary 
responsibility triggered by violations committed by states and international organizations. In fact, under 
the two sets of Articles this is only partial. States are not said to be responsible for ordinary violations 
by international organizations, and international organizations are not said to be responsible for 
violations of peremptory norms by states. 
43 Article 16 ARS; Article 14 ARIO. 
44 Article 17 ARS; Article 15 ARIO. 
45 Article 18 ARS; Article 16 ARIO. 
46 Article 41 ARS (states in relation to violations by states). Article 42 ARIO (states and international 
organizations in relation to violations by international organizations). See above at n 42. 
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where, using its economic leverage or other means of influence at its disposal, 
one State requires that another State accept the inclusion in a trade or 
investment agreement of a provision that will prohibit that State from 
complying with its human rights obligations towards its own population or 
that will impede such compliance, the former State may be seen as coercing 
the latter State, which engages its international responsibility.47 
 
In principle, this is a possibility. However, as is clear from Article 18 itself (and the 
other ancillary obligations here mentioned), this would require that the state at issue 
know that the implementation of the obligation will cause human rights violations. 
This is a high standard, and it is doubtful that a party negotiating a trade agreement 
will ever know with the requisite degree of certainty that a given obligation will result 
in a violation of human rights obligations. On the other hand, the EU’s ancillary 
obligations could be at stake in the event that it knowingly permitted the export of 
instruments of repression to another state knowing that they were to be used by that 
state for torture.48 
 The obligation not to allow territory to be used to harm other states (b)
A second rule relevant to the enjoyment of human rights in third countries is the 
obligation requiring States not to allow third parties in their territory to cause harm to 
other states. This obligation is usually dated to the 1941 Trail Smelter arbitration, in 
which it was said that ‘no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in 
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another’.49 The 
principle was stated more broadly in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, which affirmed 
‘every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States’. 50  These cases have inspired one of the 
fundamental principles of international environmental law, endorsed by the ICJ in 
Nuclear Weapons, that ‘states must ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction’.51 
 
                                                          
47 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de 
Schutter, Addendum – Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and 
Investment Agreements, UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (19 Dec 2011), para 2.6. 
48 Art 2(2)(b) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control 
of exports of military technology and equipment [2008] OJ L335/99 requires EU Member States to 
‘exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences … to countries where serious violations of 
human rights have been established …’. 
49 Trail Smelter (US/Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1905. For an intriguing analysis of this case, see John H 
Knox, ‘The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong Parties, and the Wrong 
Law’ in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: 
Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge: CUP, 2006). 
50 Corfu Channel (UK/Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, at 22. This case is usually cited for the proposition 
that states are responsible for damage caused by an act of which they know or ‘ought to know’. The 
latter standard is an inference from a negative statement in the judgment that ‘it cannot be concluded 
from the mere fact of the control exercised … over its territory … that that State necessarily knew, or 
ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein’ (at 18). 
51 Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 29. The principle was reformulated in 
Pulp Mills (Argentina/Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 101. 
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What is the relevance of this obligation to measures with extraterritorial effects on 
individuals? In a recent statement on this issue by a consortium of academics, it has 
been claimed, on the basis of Trail Smelter, that: 
 
Customary international law prohibits a state from allowing its territory to be 
used to cause damage on the territory of another state. This results in a duty 
for the state to respect and protect human rights extraterritorially.52 
 
This is however quite an overstatement. While the obligation to prevent harm 
encompasses personal injury, including non-physical injury,53 this does not ipso facto 
mean that such injury can be described in terms of the human rights of the injured 
persons. That would be true only in two situations. The first is where the responsible 
state is subject to an obligation to respect the human rights of these persons. The 
second is where the responsible state owes the injured state an obligation to respect 
the human rights of its nationals. Such an obligation can certainly exist, as Diallo has 
made clear.54 Thus, the ‘rights of states’ referred to in Corfu Channel includes the 
rights of states to have another state respect the human rights of its nationals. 
However, this is only the case to the extent that the responsible state is already 
obliged to respect the human rights of those nationals. So in both cases the obligation 
to prevent harm recognizes but does not add to the pre-existing human rights 
obligations of the responsible state. 
 
There is also another limitation on the obligation to prevent harm, not always 
acknowledged,55 which is that it only applies to harm caused by physical agents. That 
is to say, the obligation does not apply to harm caused by a mere policy decision (by a 
state or a private actor) taken within the territory of an allegedly responsible state. So, 
for example, the EU is obliged to prevent the export of products, such as poisoned 
food, that it knows, or should know, will cause personal injury in third countries. Such 
harm could also be described in terms of the human rights of those persons if the EU 
were subject to an international obligation to respect those human rights in the first 
place. Otherwise, however, this obligation has less application than has been claimed 
for it. 
 Conditions on countermeasures (c)
Another relevant rule is that ‘[c]ountermeasures shall not affect … obligations for the 
protection of fundamental human rights’. 56  It is unclear whether the relevant 
obligations are those of the entity imposing the countermeasures or those of the target 
entity.57 In the former case, the provision would be declarative of the existing legal 
                                                          
52 de Schutter et al, above at n 2, at 1095-96 (Paragraph 9 of the Commentary to Principle 3). 
53 Diallo, Compensation [2012] ICJ Rep nyr (19 Jun 2012). The Court cited Lusitania (1923) 7 RIAA 
32, at 40, which referred to ‘suffering, injury to feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social 
position or injury to credit and reputation’ (para 18). 
54 Diallo, Preliminary Objections [2007] ICJ Rep 582, para 39. 
55  Nicola Jägers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of Accountability (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2002), at 172, cited with approval in de Schutter et al, above at n 2, at 1136 n 129. 
56 Article 50(1)(b) ARS and Article 53(1)(b) ARIO, above at n 41. An argument based on Article 
50(1)(b) ARS was described as well founded in law in Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, Prisoners 
of War – Eritrea’s Claim 17 (Eritrea/Ethiopia), Partial Award (2003) 26 RIAA 23, para 160. 
57 In favour of the view that it relates to the obligations of the target state: Hans Morten Haugen, The 
Right to Food and the TRIPS Agreement (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), at 365; in favour of the 
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situation. Thus, in a case involving an embargo on exports to Burundi, the African 
Commission warned an embargo could in principle violate states’ obligations under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.58 Should however the relevant 
obligations be those of the target entity, the rule would add to the obligations of the 
entity imposing the countermeasures. 
 
The issue does not arise if the ‘fundamental human rights’ that are mentioned are 
equally applicable to the state imposing the sanctions and the target state, for example 
if they had jus cogens status. Whether they do is unclear. It has been argued that these 
rights cannot be limited to those with a jus cogens status, on the grounds that there is 
another rule, some paragraphs on, that prohibits countermeasures affecting ‘other 
obligations under peremptory norms of general international law’ and therefore such a 
reading would lead to redundancy. 59  On the other hand, the commentary to the 
Articles explains that the second rule is directed at future jus cogens norms.60 In any 
case, this line of enquiry does not answer the question whether the obligations at issue 
are those of the state imposing countermeasures or those of the target state. 
 
More relevant, perhaps, is that the two sources cited by the commentary in support of 
this rule are framed in terms of the obligations of the entity imposing the 
countermeasures. One is the rule of international humanitarian law requiring states to 
allow the free passage of consignments of medical and hospital stores intended for 
civilians; the other is General Comment No 8 of the Committee on the International 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), according to which in imposing 
economic sanctions ‘the international community [must] do everything possible to 
protect at least the core content of the economic, social and cultural rights of the 
affected peoples of [the targeted] State.’61  Based on this, it seems that the more 
conservative point of view is probably correct, and the rule is no more than a 
reminder of what they are in any case obliged to do. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
view that it relate to the obligations of the responsible state: Silvia Borelli and Simon Olleson, 
‘Obligations Relating to Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in James Crawford et al (eds), The Law 
of International Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2010), at 1187-8. 
58 Communication 157/96, Association pour la sauvegarde de la paix au Burundi v Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire (DRC), Zambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 15-29 
May 2003, para 75. For discussion, see Takele Soboka Bulto, ‘Patching the “Legal Black Hole”: The 
Extraterritorial Reach of States’ Human Rights Duties in the African Human Rights System’ (2011) 27 
South African Journal on Human Rights 249, at 261-3. 
59 Article 50(1)(d) ARS and Article 53(1)(d) ARIO. See Martins Paparinskis, ‘Investment Arbitration 
and the Law of Countermeasures’ (2008) 79 BYIL 264, at 328-9 and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
Disobeying the Security Council. Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 
80. 
60 See International Law Commission (ILC), Commentary to Article 50, (2001) II(2) YILC 26 at 132, 
para 9, making a cross-reference to the commentary on Article 40, which considers the possibility of 
such future jus cogens norms. 
61 CESCR, General Comment No 8 on the relationship between economic sanctions and respect for 
economic, social and cultural rights (1997), para 7, reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights 
Instruments, Volume I – Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (27 May 
2008). Borelli and Olleson, above at n 57, at 1187, question whether the sentiment in General 
Comment No 8 can be extended to human rights treaties with a jurisdiction clause, which is lacking in 
the ICESCR. 
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 Customary international law based on multilateral human rights treaties (d)
Most international human rights treaties contain a clause limiting their scope to 
persons within, under or subject to the ‘jurisdiction’ of a state party. 62  Some, 
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), do not contain a general jurisdiction clause, although some specific 
obligations and all of their mechanisms for individual petitions are limited in this 
way.63 There is also no jurisdictional limitation for Article 55 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which also imposes direct human rights obligations on UN 
members.64 
 
It is clear from the judgments of the International Court of Justice65 and from the 
practice of the relevant UN committees administering these treaties66 that the presence 
of a jurisdiction clause is no bar to the application of the treaty to the first category of 
measures identified above, namely acts that take place extraterritorially. It does 
however appear to prevent the application of the treaty to measures with mere effects 
on persons abroad67 except for measures affecting property or other rights with a close 
link to the state.68 
 
The lead on this issue has been taken by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), which administers the ICESCR. This began with the 
Committee’s General Comment No 12 on the right to adequate food (1999), where it 
said that: 
 
                                                          
62 There are general jurisdiction clauses in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
For discussion, see Milanović, above at n 25, at 11-18. 
63 There are no general jurisdiction clauses in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). There are specific 
jurisdiction clauses in Article 14 ICESCR; Articles 3 and 5 CERD and in the provisions and protocols 
on individual petition in ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, and CRPD. See Milanović, ibid. 
64 Namibia, Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 131. 
65 Namibia, ibid, para 131 (Article 55 of the UN Charter); Wall, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 136, 
paras 111, 112 and 113 (ICCPR, ICESCR and CRC); Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 
168, para 219 (ICCPR and CRC); CERD (Georgia/Russia), Provisional Measures [2008] ICJ Rep 353, 
paras 109 and 149 (CERD). 
66  Eg Lopez Burgos (Human Rights Committee (HRC), Comm No 52/1979, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, para 12.3 (1981)). 
67 Cf the reference to ‘control’ in HRC General Comment No 31 on the nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on states parties to the Covenant (2004), para 10, reprinted in United Nations, 
Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. In its Concluding Observations on Iran, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/Add.25 (1993), the HRC condemned Iran for issuing a fatwa against Salman Rushdie, to 
be executed outside of Iran. This is unlikely to be an example of conduct with mere effects abroad as 
suggested by Martin Scheinin, ‘Just Another Word? Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps of State 
Responsibility’ in Langford et al, above at n 26, at 225-6. More likely, it was assumed that any 
execution of the fatwa would be attributable to Iran, and so the case is better seen as one concerning 
extraterritorial conduct. 
68 Gueye (HRC, Comm No 196/1983, UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, at para 9.4 (1989) (army 
pension rights of non-nationals), Loubna El Ghar (HRC, Comm No 1107/2002, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/82/D/1107/2002 (2004) (refusal to issue passport to national resident abroad). 
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[S]tates parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food 
in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to 
provide the necessary aid when required. States parties should, in international 
agreements whenever relevant, ensure that the right to adequate food is given 
due attention and consider the development of further international legal 
instruments to that end.69 
 
It will be noted that in this passage the Committee uses the modal verb ‘should’, 
which stands in contrast to its use of the verb ‘must’ in relation to other obligations. 
Many commentators ignore this distinction, usually on the (circular) grounds that the 
Committee is known to use imprecise language.70 An alternative view would be that 
the Committee is aware of the controversial nature of these issues, and its ambiguity 
might be motivated by a desire to develop rather than to codify the law. Such a view 
would be supported by the fact that the Committee uses the verb ‘should’ in 
controversial case, and ‘must’ (or equivalent obligatory language) in less controversial 
cases. 
 
Relevantly, and as an illustration of this proposition, the Committee has used the verb 
‘must’ in relation to the obligation to ‘respect’ the rights to health (2000),71 water 
(2002)72 and social security (2007).73 It also used this language for the obligation to 
‘protect’ the right to health (2000). However, it has not used this stronger language in 
relation to the obligation to ‘protect’ any other rights, where the language remains 
non-obligatory.74 Moreover, in a 2011 Statement on state obligations regarding the 
corporate sector, the Committee used the word ‘should’ in relation to state obligations 
to protect the rights to water and social security, while omitting any reference to the 
right to protect health.75 The Committee has also refrained from using obligatory 
language in its statements on the taking of unilateral measures to ‘fulfil’ rights in third 
countries.  
 
                                                          
69 CESCR General Comment No 12 on the right to adequate food (1999), para 36, reprinted in United 
Nations, Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. 
70 The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ in de Schutter, above at n 52, are typical in this regard. More cautiously, with a 
focus on issues of complicity: Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘Extraterritoriale menschenrechtliche 
Staatenpflichten und Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) 49 Archiv des Völkerrechts 34, at 53. 
71 CESCR General Comment No 14 on the right to health, (2000), para 39 reprinted in United Nations, 
Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. 
72 CESCR General Comment No 15 on the right to water (2002), paras 31-2, reprinted in United 
Nations, Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. 
73 CESCR General Comment No 19 on the right to social security (2007), paras 53-4, reprinted in 
United Nations, Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. 
74 CESCR General Comment No 14, above at n 71, para 39. 
75  CESCR Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011), paras 5-7. Overall, this 
statement aligns neatly with the earlier assessment of the UN Special Rapporteur on Business and 
Human Rights that ‘[w]hat is difficult to derive from the treaties or the treaty bodies is any general 
obligation on States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over violations by business enterprises 
abroad.’ See John Ruggie, State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under 
the United Nations Core Human Rights Treaties: An Overview of Treaty Body Commentaries, UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 Feb 2007), para 84. 
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On the other hand, the Committee has taken a firmer line on international cooperation, 
saying that ‘international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States’.76 At least in relation 
to the rights protected under the ICESCR, this would seem to supersede Article 56 of 
the UN Charter, which requires UN members ‘to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the [UN] for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55’77 
and the attendant debate as to whether there is any obligation to cooperate outside of 
the UN framework.78 What such an obligation might entail is however unclear. At the 
time of its drafting, it seems unlikely that there was any obligation on the part of 
developed countries to finance developing countries.79 Whether anything has changed 
is debatable, especially in light of the frequent objections on the part of developed 
countries to any such suggestions.80 On the other hand, an obligation to cooperate 
may require a state party not to interfere with the ability of another state party to 
comply with its own human rights obligations. 
 
To summarize, if one takes the Committee at its word (reading ‘should’ as ‘should’ 
rather than ‘must’) then it would seem states are under obligations in relation to third 
countries to respect rights to health, water and social security and to protect the right 
to health. If one reads the word ‘should’ as ‘must’, then one can add obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfil these and other rights as well. In any case, this assumes the 
legal value of the Committee’s statements. While, like the Human Rights Committee, 
the Committee’s statements are doubtless to be accorded ‘great weight’,81 formally 
they are not authoritative, nor do they qualify as subsequent practice.82 Nor have 
states been uniformly supportive of even the most basic of these obligations, namely 
of an obligation to respect economic, social and cultural rights in situations of mere 
                                                          
76 See also CESCR General Comment No 3 on the nature of states’ parties obligations (1990), para 14, 
reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights Instruments, Volume I, above at n 61. 
77 The purposes in Article 55 of the UN Charter include the ‘promotion of universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. 
78 The drafting history and origins of the resulting compromise is recounted in Hans Kelsen, The Law 
of the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951) at 99-101, n 9. Kelsen himself considered the 
provision to be ‘[l]egally … meaningless and redundant’ (at 100). For a recent sceptical view see P 
Gandhi, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years: Its Origins, Significance and 
Impact’ (1998) 41 German Yearbook of International Law 206, 225. 
79 See Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 
156, at 191, who say ‘on the basis of the preparatory work it is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the 
argument that the commitment to international cooperation contained in the Covenant can accurately be 
characterized as a legally binding obligation upon any particular state to provide any particular form of 
assistance’.  
80 See, for example, the statements by United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Canada, France, and 
Portugal in the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Open-ended Working Group established 
with a view to considering options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/52 (10 Feb 2005), para 76. 
81 Cf Diallo (Guinea/DRC), Merits [2010] ICJ Rep 639, para 66, with reference to the HRC, which is 
established by and supervises the ICCPR. The CESCR was established by resolution of the UN 
Economic and Social Council, rather than by the IESCR, but this should make no difference. For more 
on the status of the statements of the UN human rights committees see James Harrison, The Human 
Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford: Hart, 2007), 133-6. 
82 Georg Nolte, ‘Third Report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over Time’ in Georg Nolte (ed), 
Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2013) at 384. 
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economic effect. 83  Some have even been categorically negative. 84  It is therefore 
difficult to come to a clear conclusion on the application of the ICESCR to measures 
with extraterritorial effects, other than in relation to economic sanctions. But this itself 
is a relevant result, because it means that there is no consistent and uniform practice 
supported by opinio juris that would be needed to establish a relevant rule of 
customary international law. Hence the ICESCR is not additional source of human 
rights obligations under EU law. 
D Enforcement 
Even if the EU is subject to various obligations under EU law, this by no means leads 
to the conclusion that these will be enforced. For different reasons, affected 
individuals are essentially excluded from most actions, and the EU institutions and 
Member States will have little interest in commencing legal action, even when they 
could. 
 
As far as enforcement by individual persons is concerned, there are various obstacles. 
One is to do with the legal nature of the human rights obligations being enforced. It is 
generally accepted that EU acts can ipso facto be challenged on the grounds they 
violate general principles of EU law, the source of most fundamental rights to date. 
However, it is not clear that the same assumption applies to human rights obligations 
found elsewhere in the EU Treaty, including, possibly, those found in the EU 
Charter.
85
 In particular, and of most relevance to the analysis in this article, it is likely 
that, as with other provisions of the EU Treaties, the extraterritorial human 
obligations in Article 3(5) and 21(3)(1) TEU are only enforceable by individuals if 
they are clear, precise and unconditional. The same is true of human rights obligations 
found in international treaties (such as the EU’s human rights clause), which must 
amount to ‘a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation 
or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure’.86 Customary international law 
is difficult to enforce, for a different reason. Individuals may rely on customary 
international law obligations, providing these are properly established. However, they 
will only succeed if the EU institutions have made ‘manifest errors of assessment 
concerning the conditions for applying those principles’.87 
 
Further obstacles relate to the nature of the challenged EU act (or omission), and, 
what is more, regardless of whether the challenge is directly before the EU Court of 
                                                          
83 Matthew Craven, ‘The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights’ in Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights in Action (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 77. 
84  Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Ninth Session, Summary Record of the 56th Meeting, 
E/CN.4/2003/SR.56, para 49 (Canada, denying a ‘right’ to water in response to General Comment No 
15); Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth Session, Summary Record of the 51st Meeting, 
E/CN.4/2004/SR.51, para 84 (USA, denying that there is any international obligation in relation to a 
right to food), the latter referred to in Craven, ibid. 
85 On the reviewability of insufficiently precise ‘umbrella’ rights, see Hofmann and Mihaescu, above at 
n 12, at 79. 
86 Case C-366/10, ATAA, above at n 6, para 55. It may be assumed that, unlike the WTO agreements, 
the EU’s agreements containing the human rights clause are not incapable of generating directly 
effective individual rights. 
87 Case C-366/10, ATAA, above at n 6, para 110. 
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Justice
88
 or indirectly before a national court of an EU Member State.
89
 It is well 
known that applicants are limited to challenging acts (or omissions) that affect their 
legal position, but it also appears to be the case that this means their legal position 
under EU law. In Commune de Champagne, this was one of the reasons that the EU 
Court of First Instance (now the General Court) decided that Swiss applicants were 
unable to challenge an EU international agreement before the General Court on the 
grounds that it violated EU law because their legal position in Switzerland was not 
affected by the agreement.
90
 This chimes with the statement of the EU Court of 
Justice in ATAA, in a preliminary ruling, that an individual may only challenge an EU 
act on the basis that it conflicts with customary international law ‘the act in question 
is liable to affect rights which the individual derives from European Union law or to 
create obligations under European Union law in his regard.’91 In the case of direct 
actions, this condition is mirrored by the rule limiting standing to applicants who are 
‘directly concerned’ by an EU act, which again seems to mean applicants whose legal 
position under EU law has been affected by the act at issue.
92
 
 
Putting these cases together, the conclusion seems to be that both for international 
agreements, and for customary international law, and both for direct actions before 
the EU Court of Justice and actions before national courts, an individual applicant is 
only able to challenge an EU act to the extent that this act affects its rights and 
obligations under EU law. This naturally presents a difficulty for many non-national 
non-resident individuals who are affected by EU policies. Aside from individuals with 
property or other legal interests in the EU (such as importers), most of these 
individuals do not enjoy rights and obligations under EU law.
93
 For such persons, 
both direct and indirect actions challenging EU measures are essentially foreclosed.
94
 
 
There is another option. Individuals may also bring an action before the EU Court of 
Justice for compensation for non-contractual damage caused by an EU institution.
95
 
This is a more promising cause of action, though one that is difficult to make out, as 
                                                          
88 Article 263 (direct actions challenging EU acts) and Article 265 TFEU (direct actions challenging 
omissions). 
89 National courts refer such questions to the EU Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 
267 TFEU. 
90 Case T-212/02, Commune de Champagne [2007] ECR II-2023, paras 86-95 (interpreting Article 
263(1) TFEU). 
91 Case C-366/10, ATAA, above at n 6, para 107. 
92 Case C-486/01P, Front National [2004] ECR I-6289. However, in Case C-583/11 P, Inuit [2013] 
ECR I-nyr (AG Opinion, 17 Jan 2013), para 71, Advocate General Kokott considered that a measure 
could also be of direct concern even if it only affected the factual position of the individual. The Court 
did not address this issue. 
93 This is true even in cases involving EU development aid, which is typically administered by third 
country public authorities. Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Accountability: Who is judging the European 
Development Cooperation?’ (2008) Europarecht, Beiheft 2, 162 at 180-83. Cf Case C-182/91, 
Forafrique Burkinabe SA [1993] ECR I-2184, paras 23-24. An exception would be persons living in 
EU administered territory, as occurred in Mostar. 
94 In addition, under Article 230(4) TFEU the applicant would have to be ‘individually concerned’, and 
not simply a member of a class of affected persons, unless the challenged measure is merely a 
‘regulatory act’ not requiring further implementation. 
95 This is under Article 340(2) TFEU. On non-contractual damage caused by violating fundamental 
rights, see Herwig Hofmann, Gerard Rowe and Alexander Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the 
European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 883, with further references. 
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Mugraby and Zaoui demonstrate.
96
 The difficulty is that the respective EU institutions 
will only be liable if they have ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded’ their discretion to 
act. While not unimaginable, there will not be many EU policies that can be said to 
have violated human rights obligations to quite this degree. 
 
Different issues arise in relation to legal actions brought by an EU institution or an 
EU Member State, again challenging an act or omission of an EU’s institution. In 
terms of standing, these ‘privileged applicants’ are unfettered by conditions of ‘direct 
concern’ and ‘individual concern’. It may even be that their ability to rely on 
international treaties (and hence the human rights clause) is less restricted than it is 
for individuals.
97
 The problems here are rather political in nature. It is difficult to 
imagine an EU institution
98
 challenging an EU act (or failure to act) on the grounds 
that such action (or institutional inaction) violates the human rights of persons in third 
countries.
99
 Conceivably, a Member State disgruntled at having lost a qualified 
majority vote on an EU measure might seek to redeem the situation by means of legal 
action. But this is also difficult to imagine.  
E Conclusion 
The theoretical results of the foregoing analysis are potentially significant; the 
practical results perhaps less so.  
 
It has been argued that the EU is bound by unusually broad human rights obligations 
governing the extraterritorial effects of its policy measures (this being distinct from 
the question whether these obligations also cover extraterritorial conduct). In 
particular, Article 3(5) and especially Article 21(3)(1) TEU require the EU to ‘respect’ 
human rights in respect of its external policies and internal policies with external 
effects. These include, for example, EU trade policies with negative effects on 
individuals in other countries. The EU is also subject to treaty obligations, contained 
in its many bilateral human rights clauses, to ‘respect’ human rights in both its 
internal and international policies.  
 
On the other hand, it is much less likely that these norms require the EU also to 
‘protect’ human rights extraterritorially or to ‘fulfil’ human rights other than in 
general terms. It is also uncertain whether fundamental rights as contained in the EU 
Charter or general principles of EU law apply to the extraterritorial effects of EU 
policy measures. And while some customary international law obligations, binding as 
EU law, are related to relevant extraterritorial human rights obligations, they do not 
add to these obligations. 
 
                                                          
96 See above at [text to n 17]. 
97 See C-377/98, Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079, para 54, where the EU 
Court of Justice said that ‘[e]ven if, as the Council maintains, the CBD contains provisions which do 
not have direct effect, in the sense that they do not create rights which individuals can rely on directly 
before the courts, that fact does not preclude review by the courts of compliance with the obligations 
incumbent on the Community as a party to that agreement’. 
98 Cf J H H Weiler, ‘Editorial: Dispatch from the Euro Titanic: And the Orchestra Played On’ (2010) 21 
EJIL 805 at 809 in relation to the European Parliament’s enhanced involvement in the EU’s 
international agreements.   
99 Article 263 TFEU. 
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Furthermore, the EU’s extraterritorial human rights obligations are, in practice, likely 
to remain unenforced. Individuals are prevented from challenging EU policies that 
conflict with these obligations in a number of ways, including restrictive conditions 
on the types of legal acts that can be challenged, restrictive standing rules and 
difficulties in identifying precise and therefore enforceable human rights obligations 
(except in the unlikely event that these are in the form of fundamental rights). 
Individuals might, perhaps, claim compensation for non-contractual damage by the 
EU institutions. There is also the possibility of legal action by the EU institutions or 
EU Member States, which are for various reasons less hampered by these conditions. 
But other legal and practical obstacles stand in the way of success on these grounds. 
 
The end result, then, is that while the EU’s human rights obligations should have a 
significant impact on EU policies with extraterritorial effects, this impact is unlikely 
to result from judicial enforcement. 
 
 
 
